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Introduction 
The Committee of Review investigated the 2003–2004 key stage 3 English test 
service delivery failure and interviewed key individuals from Department for 
Education and Skills (DfES), QCA divisions, the National Assessment Agency (NAA), 
the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance (AQA) and Pearson. Additionally, teacher 
unions were invited to submit evidence to the review team and individual feedback 
from teachers, markers and other interested parties was sought through the QCA 
website. 
 
The review team would like to thank those individuals and associations who invested 
their time in preparing evidence for the review. 
The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) Board established the 
following Terms of Reference for a Committee of Review at a meeting of the 
QCA Board on 30 September 2004: 
 
To inquire into and report upon the reasons for: 
 
 the late delivery of materials to schools and to markers; 
 the inadequate performance of the [e-results] website; 
 the additional week being inadequate for marking to be completed. 
 
To advise on the adequacy of the steps taken to identify and remedy these problems. 
 
To inquire into and report upon the circumstances in which the decision was taken to 
return unborderlined scripts to schools. 
 
To investigate and report upon such other matters as the Committee deems relevant 
to the review. 
 
To recommend on action to be taken to avoid service failure in 2005. 
 
Procedures 
 
The Committee should interview appropriate personnel identified by the organisations 
involved, including the DfES, AQA, Pearson, NAA and the relevant [QCA] Divisions. 
 
The Committee is chaired by Mike Beasley (QCA Board member) and includes: 
 
Edward Gould (QCA Board member) 
Sue Kirkham (QCA Board member) 
Hilary Emery (DfES) 
 
Ian Valvona (QCA Supporting Officer) 
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Executive Summary 
The 2003–2004 key stage 3 English test operations process was plagued with myriad
issues and errors. While each issue and error in itself would have been manageable,
the combination of so many caused the failure.
 
The review team found no reason to believe that the test itself, the marking quality, or 
the final national results were in doubt.  
 
The process from the printing and distribution of the test materials through to the 
publication of electronic results was, however, badly flawed causing significant 
concern and disruption in schools. 
 
The whole process was characterised by poor leadership and inadequate project 
management. 
 
In consequence the principal recommendation of this review is the establishment of a 
co-located team comprising seconded members of the key partners involved in 
delivering the process, led by a senior manager from NAA. 
 
It is considered essential that the seconded members of this team collectively accept 
corporate responsibility to ensure that the test programme is delivered. 
 
The review concluded that, whilst the issue that caused the final disruption was the 
publication of electronic results, the whole test operations process is not robust in 
any sense. 
 
The Test Operation team’s competencies in the field of process management are a 
major concern to the review team. It is essential that the recommendations of this 
report, if accepted, are executed with a thorough review of the competencies and 
capabilities of individual members in the Test Operations team.  
 
Having studied the process and the time wasted through error and inefficiencies, the 
review team believes that, with the benefit of component marking and component 
borderlining, there is adequate time to complete the test delivery task to a requisite 
quality standard. 
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Background: The Key Stage 3 English Test 
 
• Introduced as a formative and summative test regime mid-1990s. 
• 2001— Statutory targets for Year 9 pupils introduced. 
• 2002— Key stage 3 results included in secondary school performance tables. 
• 2003— Separate key stage 3 performance tables; value-added measures for 
secondary schools first published. 
• 2004— Date set by government for reaching first national targets for key stage 
3 results. 
 
The form of the test remained the same from the mid-1990s to 2002.  In 2002–2003 
the reading test changed to include more, shorter questions.  The writing scores are 
now made up of one short and one longer writing task, with a more atomistic mark 
scheme than previously, designed to encourage more accuracy and precision in 
marking. In 2003–2004 the shorter writing task was part of the Shakespeare test. 
 
In 2002–2003 it became possible for the first time to have separate reading and 
writing levels for each pupil. In 2003–2004 the arrangements for marking moved to 
component marking, to reduce the burden on markers and encourage more accurate 
marking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The review team believes that the summative nature of the key stage 3 English test 
has, over time, become more significant, driven in part by government’s decision to 
report national performance datasets. On the other hand, most teachers appear to 
want the tests to serve a more diagnostic, formative role. The DfES also wants the 
tests to serve as formative tools. 
 
Scoping the Problem 
Figure 1 illustrates the planned process. 
 
On Thursday 6 May and Friday 7 May 2004, approximately 624,000 pupils from 
4,500 state-maintained and independent schools, pupil referral units and hospitals 
sat their statutory key stage 3 English National Curriculum tests. Over these two 
days, pupils sat three separate English tests at times designated by QCA. The three 
tests consisted of: 
 
• Reading paper (15 minutes reading time; 1 hour to write answers) 
• Writing paper (45 minutes) 
• Shakespeare paper—assesses reading and writing (1 hour, 15 minutes). 
 
This year a very significant number of schools were affected by delays and 
operational difficulties. 
 
Component marking is the marking of writing and reading as separate 
parts of the English test.  
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The main problems experienced included: 
 
Late delivery of test papers 
In 2003–2004 a significant number of schools reported that test papers were 
delivered later than the published date which was 19–23 April 2004. On the actual 
test days there were still some schools that had not received their papers.  
Furthermore, where schools had indicated that they needed further test papers 
because their pupil numbers had changed, these requests were often unprocessed 
resulting in schools having to wait even longer for their full complement of papers. 
 
Late delivery of administrative materials  
Schools should have received all administrative materials (i.e. Schools’ Guide, 
marksheets and stationery) by 23 April. QCA Customer Services received a volume 
of telephone calls and emails that appeared to indicate deliveries had not started until 
week commencing 4 May. Some schools did not have these materials before the 
tests took place. 
 
Late results 
Schools were advised in January 2004 that, due to new component marking 
arrangements, their key stage 3 results would not be available until 13 July, a week 
later than published in the Assessment and Reporting Arrangements documentation 
sent to all schools. Component marking meant that reading and writing marking was 
undertaken by two separate markers not one marker as in previous years. On 13 July 
only 77% of schools had received their results. The remaining schools received their 
results in the following few days but by this time many schools had already broken up 
for the summer holidays. 
 
Incomplete results 
Some schools receiving their results in July received incomplete results because, in 
some instances, their pupils’ scripts had not been borderlined. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Schools were further inconvenienced by having to return those pupils’ scripts 
requiring borderlining, and wait until mid-to-late September for the results. 
 
At the time this report was submitted to the QCA Board on 9 November one school 
(250 pupils) still had borderline marking outstanding and 18 schools (332 pupils) 
review marking outstanding. These scripts will be marked by 12 November.    
 
Borderlining is a check that is carried out on test scripts that fall within 
three marks below the whole subject level thresholds. The intention of 
this activity is to check and adjust pupils’ National Curriculum levels, if 
that adjustment is justified on the basis of quality and fairness. 
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The Impact on Schools, Markers and Government 
 
Schools 
The impact of the failure on schools was clear to the review team from the earliest 
stage of the review. Anger, frustration and disillusionment underpinned virtually all of 
the submissions received from schools, and LEAs working closely with them. Those 
feelings were clearly linked to the increasingly high-stakes role that the key stage 3 
English test plays in school life. Further exploration of this role lies outside the review 
team’s remit but, nevertheless, it is a fact that school-level key stage 3 test results 
have a significant impact on schools with the potential to affect teachers’ careers. 
 
Most teachers and subject leaders work extremely hard to prepare their pupils for the 
key stage 3 English test. They feel that the delivery failure undermines their 
professionalism in the eyes of parents, to whom they need to report accurate results 
and impacts on pupils whose teaching and learning requirements may need 
reviewing in the light of the test results. 
 
Although the NAA did apologise for the delivery failure in July 2004, there is a feeling 
among teachers that there has not been an appropriate recognition of the hours they 
have had to spend on checking papers, writing appeal letters, making phone calls 
chasing papers, downloading results and remarking papers. There was a perception 
that the marking and data collection processes had not been carried out accurately 
by the External Marking Agency (AQA) or the Data Collection Agency (Pearson) in 
the first place. 
 
Markers 
Markers have also been affected by the delivery failure. The vast majority of markers, 
employed by AQA, are extremely professional. Frequently, they are teachers who 
choose to mark pupils’ scripts in order to develop professionally and gain a more 
sophisticated understanding of the assessment process, rather than simply to earn 
extra money. 
 
From the markers’ point of view the issues eroding teachers’ confidence in the 
English test in 2004 were around data collection and results dissemination, not 
marking, although a perception spread that the marking process was flawed and 
some markers joined the public debate to defend their professional integrity. 
However, the review team did identify a historic inability to recruit enough markers as 
a key issue during the review. 
 
It is possible that this annual difficulty in recruiting markers has implications for 
marking quality although the review team found it difficult to identify any evidence 
that clearly establishes marking quality as an issue. The criterion for judging marking 
quality normally used is the number of reviews submitted by schools that are upheld 
by the External Marking Agency (AQA), expressed as a percentage of the whole 
cohort. The review team found this an unreliable and unsatisfactory criterion due to 
the inconsistencies in the way data has been collected from year to year and the lack 
of information on the reasons why schools may or may not decide to request a 
review.
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Government 
The DfES sees the key stage 3 English test delivery failure as having detracted from 
the quest for better quality marking. Feedback to senior officials and ministers from 
schools and the National Strategies underscores the significant reputational damage 
done to the key stage 3 English tests. Publication of the provisional national statistics 
for key stage 3 English has been significantly delayed whilst publication of the key 
stage 3 Achievement and Attainment Tables has been postponed until March 2005. 
Regaining Teacher and Marker Confidence 
As the review team worked through the evidence it became clear that teachers and 
markers have lacked confidence in the key stage 3 English test for several years. 
This is despite a process of improvement in both the nature and approach to testing 
in 2003, and the fact that further issues identified by QCA were addressed in 2004. 
Of these, component marking was intended to address teachers’ widespread 
concerns with marking quality. 
 
The review team sets out in this report their view of what went wrong, why and how, 
in delivering the key stage 3 English test in 2003–2004, as well as recommendations 
to prevent a similar failure in 2005 and beyond. The 2004–2005 test must be 
delivered smoothly if teacher and marker confidence in the key stage 3 English test 
process is to be restored. The following view from a school reflects well a minimum 
level of service expected from a national system of assessment: 
 
“As a school, we need to know well in advance what format of results will be issued 
to us, and by when. Final overall English levels should be clearly identifiable, 
reliable and accurate. The administrative burden of meticulously checking 
examiner marking script by script should not fall on schools and the entire process 
should be complete in sufficient time for us to issue accurate results to our students 
and their parents in advance of the end of the summer term.” 
 
Certainly the organisations collaborating in the smooth delivery of the test in 2004–
2005 should aspire to more than a minimum level of service. However, the review 
team is determined that future changes to the test delivery process should be fully 
‘stress-tested’ and modelled for risk. If public confidence in the test is going to be 
rebuilt from 2005 onwards schools need to be able to depend on this basic level of 
service and quality.
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Lack of Programme Management and Leadership 
Lack of programme management and leadership were the primary root causes of the 
service delivery failure in 2003–2004. While there were several specific errors and 
poor decisions associated with this test cycle (see Annex A), the overwhelming 
reason for the delivery failure was a lack of effective programme and project 
management and an absence of overall leadership of the test development and 
delivery process from start to finish. This resulted in poor communications between 
the partners in the test process. In consequence, poor decisions and actions were 
taken and, as a result, the eventual delivery difficulties were unexpected and poorly 
managed. 
 
Senior NAA managers do not appear to have effectively managed the arrival and 
departure of key personnel following the 2002–2003 test cycle and this resulted in a 
relatively inexperienced Test Operations team, lacking key project management 
competencies, delivering the 2004 test administration and marking process. 
 
Coordination between the principal partners DfES, QCA divisions, NAA, AQA and 
Pearson was poor and there was no evidence of any sense of collective 
responsibility to achieve a positive outcome until failure was both obvious and 
irreversible. The operational processes used were clearly not robust. While there 
were many specific operational failure issues they all fundamentally stem from this 
lack of leadership and ineffective programme management coupled with poor 
communication and coordination. 
 
The review team also heard evidence which suggested that DfES might usefully have 
adopted a more ‘hands-on’ role acting as part of the team helping to deliver the 2004 
key stage 3 English test, and taking their share of ownership and accountability for it, 
rather than simply asking questions for information and reporting purposes, and not 
seeking to participate in the management or direction of the process. 
 
Marking
PROPOSED NC TEST STRUCTURE 2004–05
School 
Performance 
& Account-
ability
Test 
Development
IT Logistics Commun-
ications
KS 3 English, 
Maths & Science
Manager
KS 2 
& Year 7
Manager
KS 1 & 
Foundation 
Stage Manager
DfES
QCA NC 
Division & NAA Pearson NAA
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
Pr
oc
es
s 
M
an
ag
er
s
Key Partner Organisations
Figure 2Figure 2 
 11 
Recommendations 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Whilst it should be recognised that the execution of the National Curriculum test 
process should be a repeatable, straightforward, operational issue, a combination of 
historical changes and the lack of confidence by all the parties involved as a result of 
the 2003–2004 cycle delivery failure has caused the review team to firmly believe 
that the 2004–2005 cycle should be treated as a high-intensity project. Clearly the 
regulatory function of the QCA should not be part of this management structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The team would be responsible for the end-to-end process of delivering test 
operations. It is absolutely not envisaged that the team would set policy but would 
effect a rigorous change management process for any policy change requests it 
receives. This should be an integral part of policy development. 
 
Seconded organisation members’ responsibilities are to develop and improve on the 
2003–2004 test process and to ensure that their sponsoring company and 
departments deliver the programme to the agreed timetable and quality standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The detailed process developed by the team must be tightly scheduled and modelled 
with a full range of historical variables in order to reduce risk. Given the high stakes 
nature of the 2004–2005 test delivery cycle it is recommended that the team reports 
monthly through the QCA Chief Executive to the QCA Board using an agreed status 
report. 
 
There are many recognised project management tools available. It is recommended 
that one is chosen which allows the team to rigorously track progress in order that it 
can be demonstrated on a monthly basis to the QCA Board that test operations are 
proceeding to plan.  It is likely that such a methodology will use a strong ‘gateway’ or 
‘milestone’ structure, rigorously enforcing the project team’s achievement of tasks to 
timescales.
Recommendation 1: in order to secure the 2004–2005 cycle, the review team strongly 
recommends that a matrix management structure similar to that described in Figure 2 should 
be established immediately. 
Recommendation 2: a senior NAA representative should chair the team, provide leadership 
for the entire process, and all of the identified partners in the process should second key 
members of their organisation to the team. Subject, as well as test operations, expertise 
would be included.
Recommendation 3: the team should be co-located and held accountable to develop and 
deliver a robust detailed process in a manner that allows it to become an ongoing 
operational process for subsequent years. 
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Component Marking and Subject Level Borderlining 
The review team found that there was widespread support for component marking 
which was introduced in 2003–2004. Early evaluation suggests it was a positive 
innovation addressing, to an extent, one of QCA’s priorities: the need to improve the 
quality of marking.  
 
The chart at Figure 3 reflects the planned process. There was no convincing 
evidence that the timescale for the marking in 2004 was inadequate overall, however 
it must be noted that Data Feed 4 to the DfES has not achieved 99.7% post review 
test result contractual completeness in recent years. The delays arose from the poor 
management of the associated logistical and coordination problems detailed in 
Annex A. 
 
However, in 2003–2004 full subject borderlining, coupled with component marking, 
gave rise to significant logistical and data capture issues that resulted in late, 
unreliable and incomplete electronic results to schools and the return of 
unborderlined scripts to some schools. 
 
It was clear from a senior NAA manager’s evidence to the review team that it was not 
until Friday 16 July that it was understood the problem was more serious than 
previously expected. The manager’s understanding, from as early as 5 July, was that 
90% of scripts had been completed by this date, based on the reliance the manager 
had placed on management information provided by AQA and Pearson. 
 
The review team's investigation confirms that, at this stage of the process, accurate 
and reliable management information was not available or provided by NAA’s 
suppliers. Nevertheless, irrespective of the perceived extent of the problem, the 
review team believes that it was a mistake for the NAA to return any pupils' scripts to 
schools unborderlined. This should not happen again in the future. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Component marking should be continued as it reflects wider examining practice, 
offers the potential for greater reliability and has generally been welcomed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The review team believes that component borderlining will serve to reduce logistical 
complexity and, according to initial indications, further improve marking quality and 
reliability. In line with all process changes the proposals will require a thorough 
programme of modelling to reduce risk.  
Recommendation 4: in order to make the end-to-end delivery of the key stage 3 English test 
more robust QCA and DfES should seriously consider implementing component 
borderlining. 
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Annex A 
 
Specific Errors and Issues in the 2003–2004 Key Stage 3 English Test Cycle 
 
Markers and Markscheme 
 
• Historic lack of markers for key stage 3 English. 
 
• Some markers had been recruited beyond the 31 March 2004 cut-off date for 
marker recruitment. An extra training session for markers had to be organised 
by AQA at short notice, and some of the marker materials did not arrive in 
time for the training session. Some markers were therefore not familiar with 
the markscheme before the training session. 
 
• Some marker materials were sent to the wrong addresses due to the use of a 
flawed AQA database. 
 
• Some of the test packs sent out by QCA’s distribution unit contained the 
incorrect markscheme requiring AQA to send out additional copies to markers 
before they could start their pre-training activities. 
 
• Late sign-off by NAA of school and marker documentation led to AQA having 
to omit key details from these administrative materials. 
 
• Software on the AQA marker database was flawed causing some scripts to 
be sent to markers at the wrong addresses, with consequent delays. 
 
 
Risk Analysis and Management Information 
 
• PricewaterhouseCoopers, appointed by NAA to process-model test 
operations initiatives for 2004, was appointed too late in the 2003–2004 test 
cycle. 
 
• NAA did not provide PECS (Production Engineering Consultancy Services), 
the company subcontracted by Pearson for data entry processing, with 
capacity modelling software that had been provided by QCA in previous 
years. 
 
• PricewaterhouseCoopers was given non-historical data by NAA to model the 
2003–2004 key stage 3 English test process, particularly in respect of marker 
script completion rates. There was also a delay by NAA in supplying the 
information needed for the model.  
 
• Inadequate management information processes were available for tracking 
progress on marking, borderlining and reviews, all key elements of the critical 
path of the process. 
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Procurement 
 
• The National Curriculum Test Operations procurement exercise, taking place 
in summer 2004, meant that key NAA Test Operations staff were deployed to 
work on the 2005 test contract, as well as trying to resolve issues with the 
2004 test process. 
 
• There was a poor working relationship between the two external agencies, 
AQA and Pearson, particularly during and immediately after the procurement 
exercise.  
 
• Anticipating the 2004 procurement exercise, AQA’s decision to restructure on 
a national basis meant this additional change should have been factored into 
the test cycle and risk management. 
 
 
E-Results 
 
• The late decision by Pearson, agreed by NAA, to deliver results online via the 
qcaupdate website, as opposed to delivering results via the School to School 
(s2s) website led to poorly planned implementation. 
 
• An NAA letter informed schools that ‘results’ would be published on the 
qcaupdate website from 7 July. The published data available to schools from 
7 July were ‘live’, incomplete and subject to updating and therefore unreliable. 
 
• There was no information on the qcaupdate website about the status of the 
data or warning that data could be incomplete and subject to revision. 
 
• Wrong access codes and passwords for the qcaupdate website were issued 
to schools. 
 
• The high volume of users trying to access the qcaupdate website led to a 
website failure that should have been anticipated by Pearson. More 
bandwidth had to be added. 
 
 
Subject Level Borderlining 
 
• A decision made by NAA late in the test cycle to mark at component level and 
borderline at subject level did not allow adequate time for risk assessment 
and effective implementation. 
 
• Flawed Pearson borderlining software resulted in a significant number of 
pupils’ scripts being borderlined that should not have been. 
 
• Markers were unable to access the Pearson online borderlining database as 
the ID and passwords required to log-on had been sent out the wrong way 
around. 
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Other Issues 
 
• Poor mechanisms to escalate issues between all parties. 
 
• Poor communications with schools concerning borderlining, the return of 
scripts and e-results. 
 
• Insufficient meetings of the Test Operations Board. 
 
• Failure by NAA and QCA divisions to establish a crisis management team 
once it was clear there were serious test delivery problems. 
 
• No regular, rigorous monitoring or accountability forum. 
 
• No systematic evaluation of feedback from schools, QCA divisions, DfES, 
LEAs. 
 
• Late changes by QCA to the specifications of aspects of the test delivery 
process were not worked through with suppliers before gaining agreement 
from the DfES. 
 
• The Distribution, Data Collection and External Marking Agency helplines 
failed to properly handle the volume of calls received. 
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Annex B 
 
Review Team Observations 
 
The review team observed several areas for improvement that DfES, QCA, NAA and 
schools may wish to consider. 
 
• The School Exam Office 
 
Unlike other public exams, where materials and guidance are clearly addressed to 
the exam office and have a centre code on the outside of the packet so that the 
school post room can identify them, key stage materials and guidance are variously 
addressed to the Headteacher, the KS3 Coordinator, the Assessment Coordinator, 
heads of English, Maths and Science, and even the Head of Year 9. 
 
Recommendation: all key stage materials and guidance are clearly labeled and sent 
to the exam office in secondary schools. 
  
• One Point of Contact for Schools 
 
Schools are asked to contact each different agency involved in delivering a key stage 
test for different, specific purposes. Schools do not need to know how many different 
agencies and sub-contractors there are.  For example, it is time consuming and 
frustrating for schools to work out whether to contact NAA or Pearson over particular 
queries. 
 
Recommendation: schools should have one point of contact. 
  
• Entering Pupils for National Curriculum Tests 
 
It is useful for state schools to use the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) 
data when entering pupils for the key stage tests. However, using this data does not 
accommodate independent schools. 
 
Recommendation: the review team believes that NAA, as part of their 
modernisation programme, should investigate the feasibility of a whole-school test 
and exam entry system so that entries for key stage 3 tests are carried out in the 
same way as GCSE and GCE, and administered by a school’s exam office. 
 
A clear cut-off date for pupil entry applications also needs to be established, with 
further arrangements made for adding pupils to the entry list who subsequently 
change school. 
 
• Borderlining 
 
The review team could find no overwhelming logic why pupils’ scripts that are within 
three marks above, as well as below, the whole subject level threshold are not 
borderlined. 
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Marking Quality Improvement 
 
• Marker Comparison 
 
The review team heard evidence suggesting that, on completion of the key stage 3 
English test, and after schools had sorted their pupils’ scripts into the reading and 
writing components of the test ready to send to the respective reading and writing 
markers, there could be a further, random, halving of pupils’ scripts—perhaps based 
on pupils’ surnames. 
 
A writing marker, for instance, would therefore receive half their normal writing 
component script allocation from one particular school. That marker’s total marking 
load for a particular test cycle would, however, remain unchanged in comparison to 
previous years. 
 
This technique would have the benefit of allowing the Lead Chief Marker of the 
External Marking Agency to make a comparison of the average marks of the two 
halves of a school’s writing component, for instance, which would be an effective tool 
in helping to gauge marking quality. It was further understood by the review team that 
this would be a better technique than relying on reviews upheld by the External 
Marking Agency, expressed as a percentage of the whole cohort. 
 
• Reviewing Schools’ Results before Returning Scripts to Schools 
 
The review team felt that, in the longer term, it would be worth considering how the 
test system could be designed so that a more considered approach to the process of 
seeking reviews of pupils’ scripts could be implemented. Although electronic results 
for schools were introduced, unsuccessfully, for the first time in 2003–2004 schools 
were also supposed to receive their pupils’ scripts back by 13 July, before the end of 
the summer term, although only 77% of schools received their scripts back by this 
date. 
 
At the moment the test system is designed around schools receiving their pupils’ 
marks and National Curriculum levels from markers sending scripts directly back to 
schools before the end of the summer term. 
 
This leaves very little time for the External Marking Agency to carry out further 
marking quality checks on pupils’ scripts. In future, if historic National Curriculum 
level data for individual schools were made available to the External Marking Agency, 
it would give the agency another tool to identify, review and resolve any results that 
appeared anomalous based on historic trends before pupils’ scripts are sent back to 
schools. 
 
It was suggested that schools receive only their pupils’ National Curriculum levels 
before the end of the summer term and receive their pupils’ scripts separately 
perhaps after the summer term has finished. The review team considered that this 
could lead to a more considered appeals process. 
 
In the longer term consideration should also be given to reviewing the comparison 
between the teacher assessment and the test outcome. Variations should be 
reviewed to check further the reliability of the test outcomes. 
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Recommendation: that further consideration be given to how a mechanism could be 
introduced to check schools’ key stage 3 English test results against schools’ historic 
National Curriculum level data, before pupils’ scripts are returned. Pearson and NAA 
should give further consideration to any changes to the review process that may be 
required as a result. 
 
• Teacher Assessment and Review Requests 
 
On the basis that teacher assessments are submitted prior to receiving National 
Curriculum test results, the review team heard evidence suggesting that teacher 
assessment could usefully be another criterion incorporated into the process 
whereby schools request reviews of their pupils’ scripts. Teachers requesting a 
review would enter the pupil’s Teacher Assessment level on the necessary 
documentation before submitting the request. 
 
Recommendation: in the longer term, consideration should be given to the use of 
teacher assessment as a criterion for schools to use when submitting review 
requests. Further consideration should also be given to whether there needs to be a 
cut-off date for review requests. 
 
 
• Key Stage 3 Science 
 
In 2003–2004 the review team noted that there were also some delays in delivering 
key stage 3 Science tests to some schools. 
 
 
• Regulating the National Assessment Agency 
 
The QCA Regulation & Standards Division should clearly define its regulatory role in 
relation to the NAA. It is essential that this QCA division remains outside of the co-
located test delivery management structure. 
 
 
• Key Stage 3 English Markscheme 
 
The markscheme became more complex in 2003 for technical reasons associated 
with the test structure and, in part, as an attempt to reduce the subjectivity of English 
marking. In 2004 the markscheme was split as a result of component marking and in 
order to improve the manageability of the marking task. However, the nature of 
English as a National Curriculum subject means that, in an attempt to achieve 
consistent objective results, the marking structure has become highly atomised. 
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Annex C 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AQA  Assessment and Qualifications Alliance 
COI  COI Communications 
DCA  Data Collection Agency (Pearson) 
DfES  Department for Education and Skills 
EMA  External Marking Agency (AQA) 
LEA  Local Education Authority 
NAA  National Assessment Agency 
PECS  Production Engineering Consultancy Services 
PLASC Pupil Level Annual School Census 
QCA  Qualifications and Curriculum Authority 
 
 
